

Palestinian Incitement: The Real “Deal Breaker”

Joel Fishman

Joel Fishman is a historian and a fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. He recently served as the Chairman of the Foundation for the Research of Dutch Jewry at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Dr. Fishman is co-author (with Efraim Karsh) of La Guerre d’Oslo and is presently carrying out research on political warfare, particularly media warfare and propaganda.

I

Incitement to hatred and violence is a weapon of political warfare. It is not the result of a misunderstanding, nor does it happen randomly. States and insurgent movements that are waging war openly or engaging in low-intensity conflict, such as asymmetrical warfare, use it to advance their ends. As a weapon of political warfare, incitement belongs to the same category as agitation and propaganda. The use of this weapon reflects the basic elements of state policy and provides a reliable indicator of the way a government truly views its purpose.

Persistent reports based primarily on information from Palestine Media Watch describe the pervasiveness and intensity of Palestinian incitement against Israel.¹ Such acts include the naming of public buildings, sports facilities, and streets after Palestinian terrorists who have murdered Israeli civilians. The public discourse, which encompasses the educational system, teaching materials such as textbooks and maps,² television, billboards, and the media of popular culture (such as websites and crossword puzzles), conveys a message of hatred. It honors Palestinian “martyrs,” killed while perpetrating terror attacks against Israeli civilians and exhorts the youth to emulate such “exemplary role models.”³

Despite the fact that the government of Israel has deliberated on the matter at the cabinet level, delivered numerous formal protests, and recently instated an “Education for Peace and Incitement Index,”⁴ there continues to be a widespread lack of appreciation and even a denial of the full significance of Israel’s legitimate and substantive grievance. One of the reasons may be that the destructive effects of incitement are not immediately apparent because they are cumulative. More significantly, negotiators for years have sidestepped the problem of incitement. For example, Natan Sharansky described his great disappointment at the Wye River negotiations of 1998 when the Clinton administration systematically evaded discussing the problem of Palestinian incitement because they feared that doing

so would weaken Yasir Arafat and endanger the negotiations. At Wye, Sharansky spoke directly with President Bill Clinton about the danger of incitement but without success.⁵

In his personal blog and commentary, former Israeli ambassador to the UN Dore Gold cited the American negotiator, Dennis Ross, who concluded retrospectively that Palestinian incitement spoiled the peace process. The following are Ross' views as depicted by Gold:

Dennis Ross... criticized the US for ignoring the issue of Palestinian incitement: "The Palestinians' systematic incitement in their media, an educational system that bred hatred, and the glorification of violence made Israelis feel that their real purpose was not peace." ...Ross is extremely open in explaining the reasons why the US did not deal with the incitement issue. Washington was always afraid of halting the peace process. It did not want to confront Arafat and mistakenly accepted his arguments that he was too weak. But Ross warns that there cannot be successful negotiations if there is one environment at the peace table and another environment in the streets.⁶

The truth is that at the time, Dennis Ross faithfully carried out official American policy of giving Arafat a free pass. It was good of him to admit this mistake after the fact.

II

Incitement as a Step toward Genocide

Incitement to violence and "imminent lawless action" is incompatible with peacemaking. It begins with words and ends in violence. Effectively, the gap between the two is small. Incitement is used to single out and target a population group for victimization and comprises one of the steps in the sequence that leads to genocide.

Prof. Jeffrey Herf, this generation's foremost authority on the subject of Nazi German propaganda, has emphasized the importance of a regime's public discourse, which explains why incitement must be taken seriously. Herf wrote:

... I want to underscore the importance of Nazism's public record. For amid the lies and in the absence of proper names and specific places, Nazi leaders and propagandists spoke in public to millions of people in a more blunt, forthright, and perversely honest manner about their intentions

toward the Jews than many officials and journalists at the time as well as historians have since acknowledged. Not only did the Nazis mean what they said when it came to their plans for European Jewry, they said what they meant in print and on the radio, reaching hundreds of thousands of readers and millions of listeners. In public discourse they did so without the euphemisms that became so famous in postwar analysis of the language of totalitarianism.⁷

Herf's observations confirm Hannah Arendt's earlier finding: "...in order not to overestimate the importance of the propaganda lies one should recall the much more numerous instances in which Hitler was completely sincere and brutally unequivocal in the definition of the movement's true aims, but they were simply not acknowledged by a public unprepared for such consistency."⁸

Arendt noted that Hitler and Stalin, who led totalitarian regimes, operated as heads of secret societies, except in one respect: they stated their goals publicly and without euphemism. She wrote, "That the Nazis wanted to conquer the world, deport 'racially alien' peoples and exterminate those of 'inferior biological heritage,' that the Bolsheviks work for the world revolution was never a secret; these aims, on the contrary, were always part of their propaganda...."⁹

As we know from experience, incitement that is diffused publicly for the purpose of encouraging others to commit an offense is a grave matter because it can well be criminal. It provides the means for translating hatred into an interpretive framework (to use Herf's formulation)¹⁰ and, for example, was identified in the genocidal crimes that took place in Rwanda.¹¹ Moreover, the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide has identified direct and public incitement as a crime, whether or not it results in genocide. Robert Cryer, in his entry on incitement in *The Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity*, described the nature of this crime:

Direct and public incitement to commit genocide is criminalized in Article III(c) of the 1948 Genocide Convention. A provision akin to Article III (c) can be found in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Article 25 (3) (e)). Incitement is one of a limited group of crimes related to genocide (the others are attempts at genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide) which do not require the commission of one of the genocidal acts set out in Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Incitement, attempt, and conspiracy are crimes in themselves. As none of these offenses requires an act of genocide to be committed, they are referred to as inchoate (incomplete) crimes. Their incompleteness does not change the fact that they are criminal¹²

Scholars in the relatively new field of genocide studies have also recognized the danger of incitement. Gregory H. Stanton, president of Genocide Watch, described what he termed “The Eight Stages of Genocide” in a 1996 briefing paper, which he originally presented at the American State Department. According to Stanton, these are the eight identifiable stages:

- 1) Classification
- 2) Symbolization
- 3) Dehumanization
- 4) Organization
- 5) Polarization
- 6) Preparation
- 7) Extermination
- 8) Denial.

Incitement belongs to stage 3, which Stanton described as Dehumanization: One denies the humanity of the other group, the members of which are equated with animals (such as apes and pigs) vermin, insects, or diseases. Dehumanization numbs the normal human revulsion against murder. At this stage, hate propaganda in print and on radio is used to vilify the victim group. In combating this dehumanization, incitement to genocide should not be confused with protected speech. Genocidal societies lack constitutional protection for countervailing speech and should be treated differently than democracies. Local and international leaders should condemn the use of hate speech and make it culturally unacceptable. Leaders who incite to genocide should be banned from international travel and have their foreign finances frozen. Hate radio stations should be shut down, and hate propaganda banned. Hate crimes and atrocities should be promptly punished.”¹⁵

Stanton’s description, which is based on concrete historical experience, offers a chillingly accurate characterization of Palestinian incitement today.

III

The Place of Incitement in the Protracted Conflict with Israel: The Strategic and Cultural Dimension

A regime may use incitement as a weapon of war in order to prepare its own population for combat and to persuade it that its demands for long-term sacrifices will ultimately be rewarded. In addition, incitement has a parallel role: to develop and enlist active political support from abroad, which may result in aggressive political interference in favor of a cause. This is part of a larger strategy, the purpose of which is to compensate for military weakness and drive the Palestinian question

to the top of the world's political agenda. Within this context, it is necessary to appreciate the broader cultural assumptions behind a strategy which makes use of incitement (and terror, for the same matter) to achieve its ends. These may not be readily apparent to a Westerner.

Thomas Friedman, in his classic, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (1989), explained that Yasir Arafat's major accomplishment as a leader was to deliver the Palestinians from oblivion to the land of "prime time."¹⁴ In the absence of any Israeli counter-challenge, Arafat was able to create the illusion that the Palestinians had a real moral claim, that they had suffered unjustly, and that it was the obligation of men of good will to set things right. During the Second Intifada in October 2000, Friedman contributed the sequel to this interpretation in a classical editorial, "Arafat's War," demonstrating that Arafat consistently preferred the land of "prime time" over a practical solution. After the breakdown of Camp David II and the fact that President Clinton assigned the guilt to the Palestinian side, Friedman opined:

Mr. Arafat had a dilemma: make some compromises, build on Mr. Barak's opening bid and try to get it closer to 100 percent—and regain the moral high ground that way—or provoke the Israelis into brutalizing Palestinians again, and regain the moral high ground that way. Mr. Arafat chose the latter. So instead of responding to Mr. Barak's peacemaking overture, he and his boys responded to Ariel Sharon's peace-destroying provocation. In short, the Palestinians could not deal with Barak, so they had to turn him into Sharon. And they did.¹⁵

When Friedman first presented this theory in 1989, he thought that Arafat's approach was unsustainable.¹⁶ More than two decades later, and with some disappointment, Friedman recognized this very policy once again when the Palestinians brought about the breakdown of the Camp David talks and unleashed the Second Intifada. It should also be noted that the Palestinians employed the identical approach at the World Conference against Racism (WCAR) 2001, which took place in Durban. There, the Palestinians and their allies seized control of the agenda and prevented other groups with genuine grievances, such as the descendants of slaves who were brought involuntarily to the Western Hemisphere, from receiving a fair hearing.¹⁷

Using continuous incitement, combined with diplomacy and terror, the Palestinians achieved considerable success by propagating the belief that if only the outside powers could compel Israel to make sufficient concessions, peace would be possible. At the same time, it should be noted, Western ideals of fairness inclined policymakers to seek both sides of the story, to search for compromises, and to split

the difference where possible. This type of reasonable and “businesslike” approach usually works in the West, but there are some exceptions. The Palestinian case is one of these because their strategic goals are absolute and uncompromising.

This brings us to a discussion of the main principle of asymmetric warfare. According to Mao Zedong, “The basic principle of war is to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy.”¹⁸ That means that in order to prevail the Palestinians must stay in existence and persevere with their struggle to destroy Israel, but if terror and violence do not work in the short run, then permanent political incitement and propaganda become critically essential.

From this perspective, it is necessary to understand the absolutely central place of time, the fourth dimension, in Palestinian strategic thinking. The amount of time which they are prepared to allocate to achieving their goals is infinite. During the early 1970s, the PLO, which sought the advice of the North Vietnamese, adopted the Strategy of Stages, or of “Phased Goals.” The Vietnamese counseled the PLO to work for their goals in phases, which would conceal their real purpose, permit strategic deception, and give the appearance of moderation. The PLO formally adopted this approach in 1974.¹⁹ It is within this perspective, making use of time, even over generations, that one may grasp the true intent of Arafat and his organization. During a visit to Venezuela in 1980, he declared: “Peace for us means the destruction of Israel. We are preparing for an all-out war, a war which will last for generations We shall not rest until the day when we return to our home, and until we destroy Israel....The destruction of Israel is the goal of our struggle, and the guidelines of that struggle have remained firm since the establishment of Fatah in 1965.”²⁰

Similarly, Friedman, who devoted careful attention to this special sense of time, quoted Abu Jihad (Khalil Wazir), who, when asked why he refused to come to terms with Israel, declared, “We will not be squeezed by time.”²¹ Friedman also cited Yasir Arafat who stated in his *Playboy* interview of September 1988 that the Palestinians would be willing to wait as long as it takes. “The Vietnamese took 35 years of continuous war. The Algerians, 150; the Rhodesians, about 100; the Saudis, 500. But from the beginning we believed that sooner or later, we would achieve our goals, because we are WITH the tide of history, while Israel is AGAINST it.”²²

The late Faisal Husseini, whom the press designated as a “moderate,” carefully reflected on the place of time in the Palestinian strategy. He drew a sophisticated distinction between types of time, ranging from the short spans to the long duration. The following statement is taken from Husseini’s last interview, published in June

2001. His declaration is perfectly consistent with those of Khalil Wazir and Yasir Arafat:

You are dragging me into talking about what we refer to as our “strategic” goals and our “political” goals, or the *phased goals* [author’s emphasis]. The “strategic” goals are the “higher goals,” the “long-term goals,” or the “unwavering goals,” the goals that are based on solid pan-Arab historic rights and principles. Whereas the “political” goals are those goals which were set for a temporary timeframe, considering the [constraints of] the existing international system, the balance of power, our own abilities, and other considerations which “vary” from time to time.

When we are asking all the Palestinian forces and factions to look at the Oslo Agreement and at other agreements as “temporary” procedures, or phased goals, this means that *we are ambushing the Israelis and cheating them* [author’s emphasis]....

Our ultimate goal is [still] the liberation of all historical Palestine from the [Jordan] River to the [Mediterranean] Sea, even if this means that the conflict will last for another thousand years or for many generations.²³

It should also be noted that Hussein’s grasp of time, in the short and long term, as a component of strategy, is closely bound to absolute maximalist goals combined with a corresponding approach that views warfare as being continuous. In retrospect, this statement has proved painful for certain Israelis, because Hussein, during the period preceding Oslo, used his talents to cultivate support in Israel for the Oslo agreements. Working with Israeli “peace activists,” it was his objective to shift the Israeli consensus in support of an agreement with the Palestinians. But, as he admitted, such endeavors were part of a larger and commonly understood strategy of deception. Difficult as it may be for some Israelis, we must have the humility to listen carefully to the “public discourse” of our adversaries in their own words and to understand their strategic goals and intentions. Faisal Hussein’s declaration, as well as similar statements of the Palestinian media, should not be dismissed. They tell the truth.

If the armed struggle must be continuous until the ultimate goals are achieved, then negotiations, the generally understood purpose of which is to bring hostilities to an end, take on an entirely different meaning. Those who have adopted a long-range program of conquest do not consider peaceful relations to be the “default” condition that results when hostilities cease, and this represents a cultural “disconnect” with Western culture. For those who engage in protracted conflict, “peacemaking” offers a means of gaining advantage through deception.²⁴ Also,

a combatant may use the actual meeting between sides as a means of eroding the legitimacy of its adversary. This method belongs to an approach known as “fighting and negotiating,” a method put to good use by the Chinese and later the North Vietnamese during the last century.²⁵ The classical example of this method is Lenin’s decision to accept the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918 between the Central Powers and the newly founded Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The terms of this treaty were absolutely draconian but would never be implemented. Most importantly, it took Russia out of World War I and gave the Bolsheviks time to consolidate the new revolution.

The approach of fighting and negotiating is based on the assumption that war (usually between states but also among peoples) is the natural state of affairs.²⁶ This perspective may be found in both the Islamic and Leninist traditions, which divide the world into opposing camps. According to Islam, the world is divided into *Dar al-Islam* [the House of Islam] and *Dar al-Harb* [the House of War]. In classical Islamic teaching, everything that is outside *Dar al-Islam* belongs to *Dar al-Harb*. Similarly, Lenin argued that a state of war would prevail until socialism achieved its ultimate victory over capitalism.²⁷ Bernard Lewis likened the two views: “The traditional Islamic division of the world into the House of Islam and the House of War, two necessarily opposed groups, of which the first has the collective obligation of perpetual struggle against the second, also has obvious parallels in the Communist view of world affairs. There again, the content of belief is utterly different, but the aggressive fanaticism of the believer is the same.”²⁸

Our discussion of incitement and its place in protracted conflict indicates the centrality of the time dimension in the Palestinian strategy. No less important is the need to appreciate the meaning of historical time. Fernand Braudel, the eminent French historian, in his fine essay, “The Longue Durée,” endeavored to explain the meaning of “historical time.” He identified what he termed the “two poles of time: the instant and the *longue durée*.”²⁹ Braudel explained that in history, there are things that move quickly, things that move slowly, and things that do not move at all. In his view, individual events were ephemeral, like fireflies in the night. For Braudel, “the short time span is the most capricious and the most delusive of all.”³⁰ In contrast, developments that take place over the long term, such as the building of societies and social structures, have transcendent value from which it is possible to derive solid knowledge. “For nothing is more important, nothing comes closer to the crux of social reality than this living, intimate infinitely repeated opposition between the instant of time and that time which flows slowly.”³¹ For this reason, Braudel considered that history *sur la longue durée* had more useful information than *l’histoire événementiel*, history based on individual events. History over the long term has wider terms of reference and makes it possible to understand “the preeminent role of the history of institutions, of religions, of civilizations...”³² In

the following discussion we shall now consider the type of political structure for which the propagation of incitement is an essential need.

IV

Incitement and the Structural Nature of the Regimes that Support It

Beyond the use of incitement in protracted conflict, it serves an important need for the non-democratic state whose society is governed by means of fear. It is a lever of power. Natan Sharansky and Ron Dermer describe the internal need for this type of state to designate an enemy. They distinguish between “fear societies” and democracies. According to Sharansky and Dermer, “Fear regimes look to other methods to stay in power. One of the oldest and most effective is the creation of external enemies. These external enemies are used by nondemocratic leaders to slow down the natural process of alienation within fear societies and even at times reverse it: The pool of true believers is maintained and doublethinkers are occasionally transformed back into loyalists.”⁵³ Thus, “the external policies of the regime become an extension of the regime’s constant effort to maintain internal stability.”⁵⁴ Within this perspective, Palestinian incitement against Israel, Israelis and “the Jews,” both domestically and abroad, serves the same need. It would be a serious mistake to assume that incitement is limited by the geographical bounds of the Palestinian Authority. They export it wholesale.

Sharansky and Dermer made an additional observation. They argue that democracies do not engage in incitement, but totalitarian regimes use fear to manage their populations. It follows, therefore, that the type of government is a matter of critical importance. This fact has been known from ancient times.

According to the Greek philosopher, Aristotle, the founder of political science (384–322 BCE), each type of government possesses an organization and structure in keeping with its purpose. This organization is its constitution.⁵⁵ Thus, there is a close correlation between the purpose of a constitution and the nature of the city (or state) to which it belongs.⁵⁶ For example, the people are sovereign in a democracy, and in an oligarchy the few. The purpose, or *telos*, of a democracy is to make the “good life” available to its citizens, affording them the opportunity to live a life of virtue or excellence (and this represents the link between politics and ethics).⁵⁷ To achieve its purpose, the democracy needs peace. For the democracy, war is necessary as the means of attaining goals compatible with the purpose of this form of government.⁵⁸ One makes war in order to gain peace. Thus, war as an end in its own right is unworthy.

Aristotle wrote disapprovingly that, “In Sparta, for instance, and in Crete the system of education and most of the laws are framed with a general view to war.”³⁹ He wrote that the militaristic Spartans had a bad constitution and poor lawgivers.⁴⁰

For Aristotle, the system of education and the laws must conform with the nature of the constitution in order to assure its continuity.

The greatest, however, of all the means we have mentioned for ensuring the stability of constitutions—but one which is nowadays generally neglected—is the education of citizens in the spirit of their constitution. There is no advantage in the best of laws, even when they are sanctioned by general civic consent, if the citizens themselves have not been attuned, by the force of habit and the influence of teaching, to the right constitutional temper—which will be the temper of democracy where the laws are democratic, and where they are oligarchical, they will be that of oligarchy. If an individual can lack self-control, so can a city...⁴¹

According to this logic, the form of government of the Palestinian Authority is a type of oligarchy whose purpose is war against Israel.⁴² Its educational system is consistent with this bellicose goal. The purpose of this regime, which Bernard Lewis once described as a “corrupt tyranny,”⁴³ is war, namely, to destroy Israel, the Jewish state—no matter how long it takes.⁴⁴ It views the “armed struggle” and deception as the means by which it can achieve its goals and has adapted its educational system to fill the younger generation with hatred and the desire to perpetrate terrorist acts. The divergence between the two different forms of government and their purposes represents an insurmountable structural and existential incompatibility.

V

Incitement and the Contemporary Reality

Despite the fact that Yasir Arafat staged a festive ceremony in Gaza for the benefit of President Clinton in December 1998, the PA did not annul or disavow those articles of the Palestinian Charter, their founding document, which call for the destruction of Israel.⁴⁵ According to Sharansky and Dermer, “Arafat’s speech declaring the change of the charter was as vague as possible, and the ‘vote’ was an orchestrated raising of hands that collapsed into applause for the ‘Great Leader and Teacher.’ The whole thing was a charade.”⁴⁶ The goal of the Palestinians

remains the conquest of Israel and explains why Palestinian leaders recently rejected out of hand recognition of Israel as the Jewish state.⁴⁷

Researchers who have dealt with the history of the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians have referred to issues such as the disposition of Jerusalem or the “right of return” for Palestinian refugees as “the deal breaker.”⁴⁸ These may be intractable issues in the absence of goodwill, but the problem of incitement is essentially of a much greater order. For Israel—the Jewish state—the Palestinian regime that engages in incitement represents an existential danger. This is the difference. Because of the reality behind it, this is the “deal breaker.” One side wants peace, while the other does not. This is not the type of misunderstanding that can be remedied by closing one’s eyes, as President Shimon Peres once recommended.⁴⁹ The ultimate purpose of each people, of each society, and their leadership are basically opposed.

At present, the continuation of incitement indicates that fundamentally there is no real prospect of reaching a stable, long-term arrangement through the political process. Although it is fashionable occasionally to speak of a “window of opportunity” with regard to the negotiations, this perspective reflects the impatience of the Western approach, a cultural misperception. If we may borrow from the language of Braudel, belief in the idea of a window of opportunity is just “a bet on the irreplaceable value of the present moment.”⁵⁰ Such bets usually do not pay off, particularly if the other side is not terribly interested in taking its gains today but prefers to play for larger, long-term stakes.

VI

The Long-Term Remedy

During the 1980s, and well before the Oslo negotiations, some optimists anticipated that the new Palestinian Authority would become the first Arab democracy in the region to possess the features of modern self-government. In his study, *Ivory Towers on Sand*, Martin Kramer reported that the “Palestinian exception” was one of the paradigms prevailing in American academic circles.⁵¹ The Palestinians “were believed to have a vibrant ‘civil society,’ both inside and outside Palestine. They had representative institutions, unions, and associations. Their leaders were accountable. Allow them self-rule, and the Palestinians would prove that the Arab world could sustain democracy.”⁵² Sadly, the Israeli leadership of the time did not recognize that it had an interest in advancing the cause of democracy under the new Palestinian Authority.⁵³

An examination of the present state of affairs raises the question of what became of the peace that the Oslo Accords were supposed to bring. The PA, which many hoped would be committed to democracy and become a good neighbor, has turned into a corrupt, authoritarian Middle Eastern regime that plunged its own population into war and has taken a high toll of innocent Israeli civilians. Through an understanding of the structural reorientation that has taken place within the PA, one may appreciate how far it has deviated from the ideal: achieving the type of peace that obtains between two healthy democracies, “the democratic peace.”⁵⁴

What should the remedy be? One must remember, as Saint Teresa of Ávila once observed, “More tears are shed over answered prayers than unanswered ones.” Nonetheless, the State of Israel has a strategic interest in the type of neighbor it has on its doorstep. As has been demonstrated above, the problem of Palestinian incitement is closely associated with the structure of the present Palestinian government and the way it views its purpose and strategic goal. Effective reform, therefore, must be the result of structural transformation. This means reconstituting political and social relationships, laws, and education along democratic lines in a manner that will conform to a change of purpose that embodies peaceful goals—that is, changing a state’s constitution, written and unwritten. To borrow from Samuel Huntington, the issue is not about regime existence but regime change.⁵⁵

The transitions to democracy that resulted from the Allied military interventions of World War II as well as the collapse of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe (the Third Wave) were cataclysmic, but numerous others have been peaceful. According to Huntington, from 1974 to 1990, thirty transitions to democracy took place in Europe, Asia, and Latin America.⁵⁶ Since then, this number has increased. As of 2001, Larry Diamond counted 121 democracies.⁵⁷

If we wish to look twenty years into the future, we should look backward to ascertain what has remained constant. One thing is clear: Israel cannot settle the Arab grievance without committing political suicide. As Yehoshafat Harkabi wrote in 1977, “The Arabs can present their case in simplistic slogans. At most they have to conceal their grievance, the redress of which in their version would be a matter of justice, as an unlimited grievance, which the opponent cannot redress to their liking and yet stay alive.”⁵⁸ This is the constant.

The Palestinians discovered that they could derive considerable advantage by pursuing a policy of fomenting incitement, domestically and abroad, making capital from a festering sore. Using this method, they have driven their maximalist demands to the top of the world’s agenda. At Durban, they hijacked the agenda of a conference ostensibly devoted to human rights and prevented other groups with grievances from being heard. Likewise, by going through the motions of

negotiating, creating crises and impasses, and at the same time refusing to agree to much, they have succeeded in pocketing valuable unreciprocated concessions. And with an extended time-frame, those who foment incitement hope that the Palestinian problem will assume larger proportions. What will happen, for example, when Iran, Turkey, Syria, and the Hizbullah decide to support such grievances with military force while America and Europe choose to look the other way? Unless they are stopped, the present leadership of the Palestinian Authority will continue to pursue this malicious strategy of incitement, and with time, the stakes will grow higher.

It is not the purpose of this article to make specific recommendations with regard to logistics of implementation. Nevertheless, there is a need to consider the desirability of bringing about regime change in the PA and the related problems of implementation. This would be the first step in assuring “the good life” and the benefits of peace to both peoples and to the region.

Notes

- ¹ For examples of recent Palestinian incitement, see the website for Palestine Media Watch, www.palwatch.org.
- ² Impact-SE, The Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education, has made a careful study of Palestinian textbooks and teaching materials. The following is a citation from their report of 2009: “Palestinian Authority Schoolbooks: An Updated Conclusion,” by Dr. Arnon Groiss, October 2009: “IMPACT-SE has studied the Palestinian Authority schoolbooks used in the current school year (2009–10), and has come to the conclusion that although positive changes have occurred in the books during the last two years, they still do not amount to forming a clear departure from the negative fundamentals in PA schoolbooks regarding the attitude to the Jewish and Israeli ‘other’ and to peaceful resolution of the Middle Eastern conflict,” www.impact-se.org/research/pa/index.html.
- ³ This is the term of Prof. Robert Wistrich, who wrote extensively about official Palestinian incitement in the chapter “The ‘Liberation’ of Palestine” of his book, *A Lethal Obsession* (New York, 2010), pp. 684–730. For additional background information on the subject, see Dore Gold, “Where Is the Issue of Education for Peace in the Olmert-Abbas Initiative?” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Vol. 7, No 15 (September 25, 2007); Also by Dore Gold, “Why Incitement is Ignored,” August 22, 2010; Justus Reid Weiner and Noam Wasserman, “ Hamas’ Determination to Perpetuate the Israeli Palestinian Conflict: The Critical Role of Hate Indoctrination,” *Jerusalem Viewpoints*, No. 545 (August 1, 2006).
- ⁴ See, for example, the Prime Minister’s Media Adviser, “PM Netanyahu’s Remarks

at the Start of the Weekly Cabinet Meeting,” Sunday, January 10, 2010, On this occasion, the prime minister delivered a clear message: “... incitement continues in the Palestinian media and education system; in its official media outlets and in the schools under its supervision. These serious actions represent a harsh violation of the Palestinians’ international obligation to prevent incitement. I say to the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority: Stop the incitement. This is not how peace is made. Peace is made by educating towards reconciliation, by encouraging good neighborly relations and by developing mutual respect. Therefore, the cessation of Palestinian incitement is a necessary condition, not for entering into discussions, but so that we may complete them in a way that will bring about genuine peace between our two peoples.” Also, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Behind the Headlines: Palestinian incitement distances peace,” January 11, 2010; Prime Minister’s Office, “Address by PM Netanyahu at the AIPAC Policy Conference,” March 22, 2010.

⁵ Natan Sharansky with Ron Dermer, *The Case for Democracy; The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny e³ Terror*. (New York, 2004), pp. 172-173.

⁶ Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace* (New York, 2004), p. 769, as cited by Dore Gold, “Why Incitement Is Ignored,” August 22, 2010.

⁷ Jeffrey Herf, “The ‘Jewish War’: Goebbels and the Antisemitic Campaigns of the Nazi Propaganda Ministry,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, XIX (2005) 1, p. 54. See also Herf, *The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust* (Cambridge, MA, 2006) and *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (New Haven: Yale, 2009).

⁸ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1958), p. 343.

⁹ *Ibid*, 378.

¹⁰ Herf, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

¹¹ Samantha Power, *“A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Perennial, 2003): 336, as cited by Justus Reid Weiner (ed.), *Referral of Iranian President Ahmadinejad on the Charge of Incitement to Commit Genocide* (Jerusalem, 2007), p. 11.

¹² Robert Cryer, “Incitement,” Dinah Shelton (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity* (Detroit, 2005), Vol. 2, pp. 493-500. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Adopted by Resolution 260 (III) A of the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1948, Article III, item c, “Direct and public incitement to commit genocide,” www.un-documents.net/cppcg.htm.

¹³ Gregory H. Stanton, “The 8 Stages of Genocide,” www.genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocide/8stagesofgenocide.html. The author thanks Prof. Dr. Johannes Houwink Ten Cate, Chairman of the Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, in Amsterdam, for references to this literature.

¹⁴ Thomas Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (New York, 1989), pp. 107–108.

¹⁵ “Arafat’s War,” *The New York Times*, October 13, 2000, www.nytimes.com/2000/10/13/opinion/foreign-affairs-arafat-s-war.html.

¹⁶ *From Beirut to Jerusalem*, *op. cit.*, p. 447.

¹⁷ See Tom Lantos, “The Durban Debacle: An Insider’s View of the World Racism

- Conference at Durban," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, XXVI (2002) 1, fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/26-1pdfs/Lantos9.pdf.
- ¹⁸ *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking, 1967), Vol. 2, p. 81.
- ¹⁹ Abu Iyad [Salah Khalaf] with Eric Rouleau, *My Home, My Land*, trans. Linda Butler Koseoglu (New York, 1978), p. 69.
- ²⁰ *El Mundo* (Caracas), February 11, 1980 as cited by Wistrich, op. cit., pp. 703 and 1080, n. 58.
- ²¹ Friedman, p. 120.
- ²² *Playboy* interview, as quoted by Thomas Friedman, p. 179.
- ²³ *Al-Arabi* (Cairo), June 24, 2001, www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP23601.
- ²⁴ *Mao Tse-Tung on Guerilla Warfare*, trans. and intro. Samuel B. Griffith (Washington, DC, 1961), pp. 21-22. See also Robert Strausz-Hupé, *Protracted Conflict* (New York, 1963). "In the eyes of Arafat and his cronies the Oslo peace process was really never about genuinely resolving the conflict or improving the lives of ordinary Palestinians but far more about ways to ultimately substitute Palestine for Israel." Wistrich, op. cit., pp. 729, 730.
- ²⁵ Robert Thompson, *Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-1969* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1970), p. 12.
- ²⁶ Vladimir I. Lenin, "War and Revolution," in Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott (eds.), *The Soviet Art of War* (Boulder, 1982), p. 25.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, "...This writer [Clausewitz], whose basic views are now undoubtedly familiar to every thinking person, nearly eighty years ago challenged the ignorant man-in-the street conception of war as being a thing apart from the policies of the government and classes concerned, as being a simple attack that disturbs the peace, and is then followed by the restoration of the peace thus disturbed...."
- ²⁸ Bernard Lewis, "Communism and Islam," *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs), XXX (January, 1954) 1, 9-10. (The author thanks Mr. Ralph Amelan, Research Librarian of the American Cultural Center, Jerusalem, for this text.) The understanding here is that the Abode of Islam will be permanently at war with the Abode of War until it is absorbed. Recently, an innovation has been added, the *dar al-da'awa*, the regions of the world where Islam is preached. *Da'awa* is the invitation to the nations to accept Islam. Shammai Fishman, "Fiqh al-Aqalliyat: A Legal Theory for Muslim Minorities," *Hudson Institute, Research Monographs on the Muslim World*, Series No. 1, Paper No. 2 (October 2006).
- ²⁹ Fernand Braudel, "History and the Social Sciences: The Longue Durée," in Sarah Matthews (ed.), *On History*, (Chicago, 1980), p. 27.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, 26.
- ³² *Ibid.*, 29.
- ³³ Natan Sharansky and Ron Dermer, *The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny e³ Terror* (New York, 2004), p. xx.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 87.

³⁵ Aristotle, *Politics*, ed. R. F. Stalley, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford, 1998), p. xi and *ibid.*, III, 6, 1278b6, p. 97.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xi, "Everything which exists by nature exists for an end and one cannot grasp its nature without understanding that end."

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. xxxv.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 255–256 and Aristotle 1333b39.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 73.

⁴¹ 1310 a12, *ibid.*, p. 208.

⁴² Robert C. Tucker described the type of governance of a regime based on the ideology of liberation movement as "a revolutionary mass-movement regime under single party auspices." *The Soviet Political Mind: Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change* (New York, 1972), p. 7.

⁴³ During the question and answer session at the conclusion of a lecture in Tel Aviv (January 31, 2001), Professor Bernard Lewis commented on Natan Sharansky's interpretation, that there cannot be peace until the Palestinian Authority becomes a democracy. He replied, "They [the Palestinians] will not have a democracy like Sweden. As long as they have a corrupt tyranny, there will be no peace." Robert Wistrich wrote about Palestinian rule in the following terms: "For forty years Arafat's PLO has pursued the illusion of conquering power in Palestine with a singular mixture of brutality, nepotism, extremist ideology, and sheer double-talk. During the last decade under Arafat, the PA became a veritable police state (employing one policeman for every forty residents) with a dozen security and intelligence services directly responsible to the *ra'is*. The malevolence of the PLO rule in southern Lebanon thirty years earlier was amply replicated in the West Bank and pre-Hamas Gaza. There was the same corruption, cronyism, racketeering, killing of opponents, and imprisoning of dissidents. Billions of dollars were siphoned off into secret Swiss bank accounts to finance the extravagant habits of the globe-trotting PLO leaders with their world-wide financial investments and western lifestyles..." Wistrich, *op. cit.*, p. 729.

⁴⁴ This is clearly stated in the Palestinian Charter, and for the same matter, the Hamas Charter, their founding documents, which identify the attainment of justice with the destruction of Israel

⁴⁵ Wistrich, *op. cit.*, p. 727.

⁴⁶ Sharansky and Dermer, *op. cit.*, p. 176, and www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/140224.

⁴⁷ See Wistrich, *op. cit.*, pp. 724–726.

⁴⁸ Ofra Seliktar, *Doomed to Failure? The Politics and Intelligence of the Oslo Peace Process* (Santa Barbara/Oxford, 2009), p. 156.

⁴⁹ "Peace is a bit like marriage. You have to close your eyes and accept what is possible to accept." Address to the General Assembly of the United Jewish Communities of North America meeting in Jerusalem in December 2008.

⁵⁰ Braudel, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁵¹ Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p.70.

⁵³ One cannot know how much influence the Israeli leadership of the time could have exerted in the formation of the new PA, but it is clear in retrospect that the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin seriously misjudged the situation when he declared, "Once a local Palestinian council is established, (that body) will be responsible for the Palestinians' internal problems, and it will deal with them as they need to be dealt with, without the hassle of the High Court of Justice, interference by B'tselem, and all kinds of left-wing bleeding hearts and organizations of mothers and fathers. As for security problems, we'll take care of that." *The Jerusalem Post*, September 3, 1993. The author thanks Ralph Amelan for this source. See also Natan Sharansky, "From Helsinki to Oslo," *Journal of International Security Affairs*, (JINSA) 1 (Summer 2001), 29.


⁵⁴ See Joel Fishman, "The Broken Promise of the Democratic Peace: Israel and the Palestinian Authority," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, *Viewpoints* No. 477 (May 1, 2002), <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp477.htm>.

⁵⁵ *The Third Wave; Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, 1991), p. 34.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 21.

⁵⁷ Larry Diamond, cited in USAID, "Global Trends in Democracy," www.usaid.gov/fani/ch01/globaltrends.htm.

⁵⁸ Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response* (New York, 1977), p. 101.



**Uneasy Neighbors:
Israel and the European Union**
Sharon Pardo and Joel Peters

"...obligatory reading for all interested in EU external relations, Israel's policy dilemmas and their dynamic interaction."

Yehezkel Dror
Professor of Political Science
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Lexington Books
A division of Rowman Littlefield
4501 Forbes Blvd., Suite 200,
Lanham, MD 20706

Cloth
0-7391-2755-1 / 978-0-7391-2755-1
Electronic
0-7391-4470-7 / 978-0-7391-4470-1
Paper
0-7391-2756-X / 978-0-7391-2756-8