

On Political Order and the “Arab Spring”

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A year has passed since a young vegetable vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, immolated himself after his cart and dignity were taken away by police in the provincial Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid. Since the death of the 26-year-old, millions of similarly disenfranchised, poor, and prospect-less Arabs have risen in revolt across North Africa and the Middle East in a phenomenon widely dubbed the “Arab Spring.”

On January 14, 2011, less than a month after Bouazizi’s death, Tunisia’s dictator Ben Ali—who had ruled the country for twenty-three years—fled to exile in Saudi Arabia. Nine months later, on October 23, Tunisians went to the polls to elect a new constituent assembly, which will draw up a new constitution. Tunisia’s formerly banned Islamist party, Hizb al-Nahda [the Renaissance Party], won the first free and fair elections to emerge from the Arab Spring.

In Egypt, after only eighteen days of mass protests, Hosni Mubarak handed over power to the military on February 11—ending the pharaoh’s thirty-year reign as president. Jubilant crowds poured into Tahrir Square to celebrate and demand a swift transition to civilian rule. The very next day the Egyptian army suspended the country’s constitution and said it would rule by martial law until elections were held. At this time, elections are being held for the lower house of the Egyptian parliament, with the Muslim Brotherhood widely expected to emerge as the largest political party in the country.

Elsewhere in the region—in Bahrain, Jordan, Iran, Morocco, Syria, and Yemen—“day of rage” protests flared up in the aftermath of the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt. They were typically accompanied by the sporadic killing of demonstrators by state security forces and the arrest of opposition leaders. In Saudi Arabia demonstrations were quelled before crowds could gather in the streets. Oil revenues were then lavishly used to bolster the salaries of Saudi policemen, teachers, and clerics.

In Libya, events unfolded very differently. Between late February 2011 and his lynching on October 20, the world's longest ruling dictator, Muammar Qadhafi, lost his country to a motley coalition of tribal militias backed by NATO air forces. In Syria, a minority Alawite regime is fighting for survival with extraordinary brutality, edging the country toward full-blown civil war. Yemen, too, slips in and out of civil war. In July, Sudan split along ethnic-religious lines into two separate states. Kurdish national aspirations are resurgent in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Al-Qa'ida leaders in the Arabian Peninsula, the Maghreb, and the Sahel are urging their adherents to seize the numerous new opportunities presented by the chaos in Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen to advance the cause of global jihad.

What are we to make of these tumultuous and varied events? What, if anything, is the common thread running through them? Are we witnessing, as Fuad Ajami would have it, a long-silenced Arab world "clamoring to be heard, eager to stake a claim to a place in the modern order of nations"?¹ Is the flowering of popular revolt doomed to be extinguished by the onset of a harsh new "Islamist Winter," as Khaled Abu Toameh warns?² Or will most Arab autocrats manage to adapt and remain in power?

The Arab Spring does not constitute a single phenomenon or a disparate series of unrelated events. Rather, what we are witnessing across North Africa and the Middle East is the simultaneous unfolding of three grand, historic political processes: democratization; authoritarian adaptation/succession; and state failure. To gain an informed understanding of these processes, we shall draw upon social science theory, outlining three stylized, archetypal interpretative lenses through which to analyze the Arab Spring.

Freedom's March: The Fourth Wave of Global Democratization

One interpretive prism would read the Arab Spring as the belated arrival of democracy in the sole region of the world that previously seemed impervious to it. Viewed through this lens, the 2011 Arab revolts represent another important milestone in the centuries-long process by which modern political norms and institutions have traveled—by conquest, trade, and diffusion of ideas—from modest origins in eighteenth-century Europe to global dominance at the beginning of the twenty-first. The "Freedom's March" interpretation goes something like this:

Three major waves of democratization occurred prior to the 2011 Arab revolts.⁵ The first, long wave (1774–1926) was rooted in the values of the American and French revolutions, but materialized in the emergence of national democratic institutions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—notably through the

gradual extension of universal adult suffrage and the establishment of executive accountability to national parliaments as a matter of law. By 1926, thirty-three countries (mostly in Europe and the overseas English dominions) had experienced the transition to democracy, though many would subsequently lapse back into old or new—and far more brutal—forms of authoritarianism in the bleak 1930s and early '40s.⁴

The Allied victory in World War II and the early phases of decolonization in Asia and Africa marked the advent of a second, short wave of democratization (1945–62). Post-war Allied occupations helped establish representative regimes in Austria, West Germany, Italy, Japan, and Korea.⁵ Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela either returned to democracy or ushered in freely elected governments for the first time between 1943 and 1946. And a number of new states—India, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka—began independent life as electoral democracies.

Despite significant retreats in the 1960s and early '70s—a reverse wave experienced most harshly in Latin America—the dialectic of history proved fortuitous to the spread of democracy once again. On April 25, 1974, the Portuguese *Revolução dos Cravos* [Carnation Revolution] led to the overthrow of the longest standing dictatorship in Southern Europe. Portugal's domestic revolution heralded the launch of a global one. The third wave of democratization quickly spread to the rest of the Iberian Peninsula and Greece. In the 1980s it then spread to Latin America, several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and, with the demise of Soviet Communism in 1989–91, to Central and Eastern Europe.

By 2000, eighty democracies were created or restored, and the percentage of democratic states in the world rose from 27 percent in 1974 to 63 percent.⁶ For the first time in human history, democracy had become not only a near-universal human aspiration, but the predominant form of government in the world.⁷ Transitions in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), and Ukraine (2004), together with steady democratic consolidation among the other Balkan states, extended global democratic gains a little further still—prompting Michael McFaul of Stanford University to identify a fourth wavelet of democratization from 2000 to 2005.⁸ In 2006 there were 123 electoral democracies, 64 percent of the world's total.⁹

Moreover, the “Freedom’s March” interpretation would assert that democracy no longer faces an ideological rival with broad global appeal. Fascism and Communism are dead, as is pan-Arabism in the Middle East. Salafist-Jihadi ideology, while antithetical to liberal values, is no match for capitalist democracy as a compelling organizing model for political order. Western victory in the Cold War and the subsequent 9/11 attacks on the United States not only facilitated the

expansion of democracy into the former Soviet bloc, the non-aligned group of states, and several Middle Eastern countries, they also eliminated chief rationales for tolerating some odious autocracies.

As a bulwark against Communist ambitions in Africa, for example, the apartheid regime in South Africa could win support among Western democracies. The disappearance of bipolarity, however, removed the already shaky ground upon which white rule rested, resulting in the breakdown of apartheid and the transition to democracy in the early 1990s. The disappearance of Soviet patronage eliminated a key pillar of support for autocratic regimes in the Middle East, notably for Egypt, Sudan, and Syria.

Even where authoritarian rulers still prevail, for the most part they no longer champion an alternative model of government, but either claim their regime was democratic (as in the case of Russian “managed democracy”) or that they are gradually steering their volatile societies toward democracy (China, Egypt under and after Mubarak, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia).

At the same time, democracy had now proven its ability to travel to regions of the world previously thought to lack the necessary economic, social, and cultural prerequisites for political freedom. In Latin America—a continent long assumed to be too Catholic to sustain the Protestant ethic—all but Cuba and Venezuela became democratic. “Asian values” and China’s ascendancy as a market autocracy notwithstanding, by 2006 democracy took root in at least ten Asian nations, including India, Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand.

In the same year, of the forty-eight sub-Saharan African states, no fewer than twenty-three (48 percent) were electoral democracies, including some of the world’s poorest, post-conflict countries.¹⁰ As Larry Diamond, co-editor of *The Journal of Democracy*, observed enthusiastically in 2003: “If democracy can emerge and persist in an extremely poor, landlocked, overwhelmingly Muslim country like Mali—in which the majority of adults are illiterate and live in absolute poverty, and the life expectancy is forty-four years—then there is no reason in principle why democracy cannot develop in most other very poor countries.”¹¹

With the advent of the Arab Spring, freedom’s long march had finally reached the southern shores of the Mediterranean and the Arab heartland. A fourth global wave of democratization is upon us, protracted and messy as it may be. Like water dripping on a rock, the forces of modernization and globalization have corroded and finally cracked open the last remaining region of the world that has long appeared—mistakenly, as it turned out—impregnable to the norms and

institutions of political competition and accountability. The fact that the revolts are occurring in clusters of geographically proximate states is also reminiscent of past patterns of democratization, which typically display regional “contagion” and “domino” effects.

In the Middle East, as in Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and even sub-Saharan Africa before it, sudden political transformation resulted from gradual socioeconomic and cultural change. Urbanization, higher levels of literacy, and the internet produced social mobilization, attitudinal change, and expectations for a better life.¹² *Al-Jazeera*, Facebook, and Twitter have made Arabs, particularly the numerous young, more capable of self-expression, more anxious to engage in political activities, and more adroit at political organization. They also removed the last vestiges of legitimacy from military, one-party, and monarchical forms of autocracy. Sooner or later, even the “benign dictatorships” of Jordan and Morocco are doomed to be swept away by the fourth wave of global democratization.

Authoritarian Adaptation and Authoritarian Succession: From the Frying Pan into the Fire

The second interpretative prism would read the Arab Spring as foreshadowing the replacement of “old” forms of Middle Eastern authoritarianism with new ones. Just as autocratic Nasirism swept away the despotic ancien régimes of King Farouk and his likes in the 1950s and ‘60s, so the decrepit remnants of Arab secular, socialist nationalism are now being succeeded by new, mostly Islamist, modes of political organization inimical to democracy. It is one thing to overthrow a dictator, the authoritarian succession interpretation would point out; quite another to replace that dictator with a functioning democratic society and state.

There are several religious, cultural, and economic characteristics of the Middle East that are likely to perpetuate Arab exceptionalism in terms of the absence of democracy. Examining the political histories of forty-five predominantly Muslim countries, analysts find that only Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mali, Senegal, and Turkey have ever had any record, however brief, of political freedom. Of these, none could ever have been described as a durable, credible democracy. Among the Arab countries, there are zero states rated by Freedom House as democratic.¹³ Historically, as Elie Kedourie documents in his seminal book, *Politics in the Middle East*, repeated attempts at liberal political reforms in North Africa and the Middle East have failed. The long-term pattern of political development in the region has been one in which one form of authoritarianism replaces another.¹⁴ Moreover, autocratic rulers in the region have generally proven adept at defusing threats to their regimes through

controlled liberalization, rather than genuine democratization. This is particularly true of the oil rich monarchies of the Persian Gulf.¹⁵

Cultural beliefs about legitimate political order among Arabs also paint a discouraging picture. The Arab Barometer survey of five countries between 2003 and 2006 found that 56 percent of respondents agreed that “men of religion should have influence over government decisions.” A 2003–04 survey found that more than half of Arab publics thought that government should only implement *Sharia* law.¹⁶

Similarly, regional dynamics militate against positive democratic development. In Europe, Latin America, and parts of Asia and Africa, countries became democratic partly by emulating the norms and institutions of the neighbors they respected and wanted to resemble. With the possible partial exception of Morocco and Tunisia (which look northwards toward Europe), Middle Eastern societies fare poorly where accountability, the rule of law, and respect for individual rights are concerned. The Arab world’s group of association is the Arab world, not North America, Europe, or Israel.

Furthermore, we are witnessing something of a “democratic recession” globally, not the advent of a new wave of democratization. In fact, since 2006, global levels of freedom have experienced the longest period of deterioration since the advent of the third wave in 1974.¹⁷

Quite unlike in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s, there is no effective liberal opposition ready to succeed the old regimes—no Arab equivalent of the Polish Solidarity movement. Decades of modern autocracy in the Arab world have all but decimated middle-class, liberal constituencies in most Arab countries. Consequently, it is only the organized Islamists who are truly positioned to exploit opportunities for acquisition of power. The Muslim Brotherhood, in particular, has an unparalleled organizational network, and no compunction in using its mosques, schools, and charities in the service of its electoral ambitions.

Structural economic conditions across most of North Africa and the Middle East also bode ill for democracy. Of the sixteen Arab countries, eleven are rentier states in that they derive more than 70 percent of their export income from oil and gas rents—income extracted from the ground, not from the productive efforts and taxation of citizens.¹⁸ In the Middle East, in other words, the Western notion of “no taxation without representation” is perverted into “no representation without taxation.” Since most Arab states do not depend on taxing their population, they have failed—and will, for the foreseeable future, continue to fail—to develop the natural expectations of accountability and representation that emerge when

states depend on tax-paying citizens. The “resource curse” of oil- and gas-derived income also retards the development of other sectors of the economy, encourages cronyism, increases corruption, and allows Arab states to spend huge resources on repressive security apparatuses.

In sum, according to the authoritarian succession prism, the Arabs would have broken one set of handcuffs only to have them replaced by a new, fresh set. The autocrats will either adapt successfully or be replaced by theocrats, not democrats.

Things Fall Apart: A Regional Cascade of State Failure

The third interpretive prism is in many respects the most historically intriguing, but also the most unsettling. According to this reading, what we are witnessing across North Africa and the Middle East is not the late onset of democratization, or the replacement of capable old forms of authoritarianism with new ones, but a regional cascade of state failure.

Lacking in security, legitimacy, and capacity, fragile modern Arab states are disintegrating. They leave behind them under-governed or ungoverned spaces that are being filled by a pre-modern, neo-medieval patchwork of non-state rulers (tribes, warlords, criminal gangs), as well as by ultramodern transnational terrorist networks such as al-Qa’ida, and new forms of hybrid terrorist/governance-providing organizations, such as Hizbullah and Hamas.

What we mean by “state failure” is perhaps best captured by recalling what we have come to expect from the modern, functioning state. The state is a political entity that successfully exercises a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory and over a given population. A “normal” state also commands the loyalty of its citizens and provides core public goods—above all, security and the rule of law, but also markets, transport infrastructure, health, and education.

Failed states are those that fall short of these minimal criteria, in that their performance is lacking in terms of security, legitimacy, and/or the capacity to deliver basic welfare-enhancing public goods. State failure is thus a gradational concept, where under-performing states range on a continuum from fragility, to failing and, *in extremis*, to fully collapsed states.¹⁹ Viewed through this prism, conditions across much of North Africa and the Middle East appear ominous.

In terms of security, state failure is predominantly caused, and accompanied, by ethnic, religious, tribal, or other forms of civil conflict. Countries experiencing serious security gaps include principally both those that are in the midst of armed

conflict and those just emerging from warfare.²⁰ We observe all four elements of the State Failure Taskforce characterization of the four major causes of state failure—revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime change, and genocides/politicides—occurring in the Middle East today.²¹

Revolutionary wars—episodes of sustained violent conflict between governments (or external occupying powers) and politically organized challengers that seek to overthrow the central government, replace its leaders, or seize power in one or more regions—are currently unfolding, with varying degrees of intensity, in Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. Bedouin and Jihadi groups are undermining Egyptian control of the Sinai Peninsula. Kurdish national aspirations hold the potential for major, protracted conflict involving Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. The military ousting of the Qadhafi regime by a coalition of NATO-backed tribal opposition militias represents a “successful” revolutionary war.

There are no fewer than 140 tribes and clans in Libya, of which thirty are influential power brokers. It remains to be seen whether the National Transitional Council of Libya is able to hold the country together in the aftermath of the 2011 civil war, or whether conflicting interests and tribal differences will plunge post-Qadhafi Libya into further civil conflict. After pledging that they would disarm and submit to a single, central army after Qadhafi’s ouster, many militia leaders in Libya now reportedly insist that they will retain their weapons and political autonomy as the new guardians of the revolution.²²

So-called ethnic wars—episodes of sustained violent conflict in which national, ethnic, religious, or other communal groups challenge governments to seek major changes in status or forms of political order—are simmering in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and among Palestinian factions. In Egypt, dozens of Coptic Christians have been killed in clashes with state security forces since October 2011. Among Palestinians, Fatah– Hamas rivalry has already led to the successful 2007 violent Hamas coup in Gaza, with Hamas seeking a further major Islamist revision in the form of politics not only in the West Bank, but in Jordan as well. And in Lebanon, Hizbullah effectively controls parts of the country and is widely acknowledged to be militarily stronger than Lebanese state forces thus exercising a permanent, hair-trigger threat to the fragile, ethnic-based constitutional order in the country.

Adverse regime change—major, abrupt shifts in patterns of governance, including periods of severe elite or regime instability—recently occurred, or is currently experienced, in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Lastly, genocide and politicide sustained activities by states or, in civil wars, by

either of the contending sides that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal or political group have taken place over the last decade in Algeria and Sudan. Genocide and politicide are also grim possible scenarios in Afghanistan and Iraq (once American troops leave), in Libya (should major reprisals be exacted against the Qadhafi tribe), and in Syria (should the ruling Alawite minority lose its grip on power).

Furthermore, according to the state failure interpretation of the Arab Spring, the security gap across much of North Africa and the Middle East is both facilitated and exacerbated by deep underlying deficits in the legitimacy and capacity of Arab states.

A legitimacy gap exists within a state when a significant portion of its political elites and society either rejects the rules regulating the exercise of power and the accumulation and distribution of wealth in the country or resorts to alternative, competing sources of authority tribal, ethnic, religious, or national.²³ Legitimate states are ones in which a strong sense of national identity has been successfully formed; where the concept of citizenship holds genuine meaning for elites and society; and where state institutions function transparently and are accountable to the people.

The underlying problem for many Arab states today lies in their fundamental lack of legitimacy. The societies of the Arab world are ancient, but as political entities they are “instant states.”²⁴ Like much of sub-Saharan Africa where the largest proportion of failed states currently exists, Arab states came into being instantly as the result of the dissolution of colonial empires. Rather than go through a slow, convoluted process of state formation culminating in the development of the rule of law, accountability, and national identity Arab states became states before they could truly become nations.

This means that, with the possible exceptions of Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and the tiny Gulf oil kingdoms, Arab states have not managed to forge the national collective identities that are so vital for the ability of a society to generate welfare-enhancing public goods, and that can effectively compete for loyalty against pre-modern tribal, ethnic, and religious identities.

To be sure, for several decades following the demise of the British, French, and Ottoman empires, Arab nationalism and Cold War patronage managed to paper over the essential differences. But the experiment in instant state formation has basically failed, and we are now witnessing the manifestation of this failure on a grand historical and regional scale. Arab states are mostly Potemkin-states; brittle entities increasingly unable to hold themselves together by commanding the

loyalty of their populace and exercising an effective monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their borders.

Security and legitimacy deficits are compounded by weak state capacity. One need only peruse the five existing Arab Human Development Reports sponsored by the UN and independently authored by courageous Arab scholars to appreciate the depth of contemporary Arab states' inability to deliver core public goods and opportunities to their bulging, youthful populations.²⁵

By 2015 Arab countries will be home to some 395 million people, compared to 150 million in 1980. Of these, over 60 percent will be under the age of 25, with a median age of 22. Despite oil wealth, GDP per capita in Arab countries grew by a paltry 6.4 percent over the entire period from 1980 to 2004 (i.e., by less than 0.5 percent annually). Oil has crowded out agriculture and manufacturing, so that Arab countries were less industrialized in 2007 than they were in 1970. Unemployment among youth and women is among the highest in the world, with the overall poverty rate ranging from a low of 30 percent in Lebanon, to a high of 59.5 percent in Yemen, and 41 percent in Egypt.²⁶ Along with sub-Saharan Africa, the Arab world is the only region where the number of hungry or starving has risen since the beginning of the 1990s.

Water scarcity and desertification are placing additional burdens on already-overstretched land, causing conflict over natural resources, population displacement, and increased drug, weapons, and human trafficking. All of this, according to the latest Arab Human Development Report, means that identity-based groups in some Arab countries have sought to free themselves from the captivity of the nation-state in whose shadow they live.²⁷ Moreover, like democratization, state failure is a regional phenomenon, in that it predominantly occurs in clusters of geographically contiguous or proximate states.²⁸

Lastly, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Arab League notwithstanding, the Middle East remains singularly lacking in meaningful regional security, political, and economic arrangements that could help hold Arab states together. There is no Arab equivalent of the European Union (EU) or the weaker Organization of American States (OAS) that might render collective assistance to Arab states in distress. There is no Arab version of NATO or even the functional equivalent of the African Union (AU) that could provide indigenous conflict-resolution mechanisms or peacekeeping forces. State failure in one or two Arab countries, particularly in strategic ones such as Iraq or Syria, are likely to produce dire spill-over effects for neighboring countries, resulting in a possible cascade of failures across the region.

All Together Now

The three sets of grand political processes outlined above are, in reality, all unfolding simultaneously in the North African and Middle Eastern geopolitical space. They are intertwining within and across national borders and interacting with one another as well as with broader variables in the contemporary international system. Briefly, they carry the following consequences for Israeli foreign policy:

Israel has a deep vested interest in the emergence of consolidated liberal democracies in North Africa and the Middle East, and so should strive, wherever possible, to establish links with genuine democrats and to empower them where it can. Moreover, just as the emergence of Southern Sudan as an independent state provided Israel with a rare opportunity to establish diplomatic, economic and security ties with a south eastern African country, resurgent Kurdish nationalism creates new opportunities for constructive alliances.

Under the authoritarian adaptation scenario, existing regimes will reluctantly liberalize in response to fear of instability; striving to accommodate and co-opt opposition forces. Such accommodation may be direct—in that it will legalize formerly banned political parties and form coalition governments with Islamists—or indirect, opening up new space for opposition participation in economic life, civil society, the media, and security forces. Authoritarian adaptation may therefore lead to the Pakistanization of the state security forces of erstwhile western supported Arab states, with Islamist elements penetrating military, police, and intelligence agencies.

Liberalized autocracy is an inherently unstable equilibrium, however, and so is likely to be succeeded, sooner or later, if not by democracy, then by new forms of authoritarianism.²⁹ Together with its allies, Israel would do well to closely study, monitor, and report on Islamist movements' efforts to exploit or subvert new political openings. Military, diplomatic, and economic aid to North African and Middle Eastern countries must also be more closely coordinated by Western powers, and conditioned more stringently on substantive democratic reforms.

State failure means reduced threat of conventional war, but also the proliferation of unconventional threats, notably the strengthening of terrorist networks and weapon smuggling. Jihadist nodes in Yemen, Sinai, Somalia, Libya, Chad, Mali and Nigeria will be in a better position to cooperate where central government control is weak or absent. Chaos in Libya and regime weakness in Egypt have already resulted in a flood of sophisticated weaponry into Sinai and Gaza. These trends are likely to deteriorate further if Syria disintegrates into civil war and Iraq becomes even weaker once US forces withdraw.

Notes

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- ² Khaled Abu Toameh, "From an Arab Spring to Islamist Winter," Hudson Institute, NY, October 28, 2011 (www.hudson-ny.org/2541/arab-spring-islamist-winter).
- ³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, (Norman, OK, 1991).
- ⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 13–18.
- ⁵ James Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, 2003).
- ⁶ Larry Diamond, "The State of Democratization at the Beginning of the 21st Century," *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* (2005), 13–18.
- ⁷ Amartya Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," *Journal of Democracy*, X:3 (1999), 3–17; Carl Gershman, "Democracy as a Policy Goal and Universal Value," *Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* (Winter/Spring, 2005), 19–38.
- ⁸ Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Post Communist World," *World Politics*, LIV: 2 (2002), 212–244.
- ⁹ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2010: Global Data* (www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw10/FIW_2010_Tables_and_Graphs.pdf).
- ¹⁰ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World Survey 2007* (www.freedomhouse.org).
- ¹¹ Larry Diamond, "Can the Whole World Become Democratic?" Center for the Study of Democracy, UC Irvine, Paper 03/05 (2003), p. 6.
- ¹² On urbanization and literacy in the Arab world, see the 2009 United Nations Arab Human Development Report (www.arab-hdr.org). For example, in 1970 only 38 percent of the population in the Arab world lived in urban areas. By 2009 it was nearly 60 percent. See also Beth Simmons, Frank Dobbin, Geoffrey Garret (eds.), *The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy* (Cambridge, 2008).
- ¹³ Alfred Stepan and Graeme Robertson, "An 'Arab' More than a 'Muslim' Democracy Gap," *Journal of Democracy*, XIV: 3 (2003), 30–44.
- ¹⁴ Elie Kedoury, *Politics in the Middle East* (New York, 1992).
- ¹⁵ See Joshua Teitelbaum (ed.), *Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf* (New York, 2009).
- ¹⁶ Figures cited in Larry Diamond, "Why Are There No Arab Democracies?" *Journal of Democracy*, XXI: 1 (2010), 96.
- ¹⁷ See Arch Puddington, "Democracy under Duress," *Journal of Democracy*, XXII: 2 (2011), 17–31.
- ¹⁸ Diamond, *op. cit.*, p. 98.
- ¹⁹ See Robert Rotberg (ed.), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton, 2004).
- ²⁰ See: Charles T. Call, "Beyond the 'failed state': Towards conceptual alternatives," *European Journal of International Relations* (2010), 5.
- ²¹ Report of the State Failure Task Force, Phase III findings (2000) (www.globalpolicy.org).

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- ²² David Kirkpatrick, "Local militias in Libya balk at giving up their arms," *International Herald Tribune*, November 2, 2011.
- ²³ Call, op. cit., p. 6.
- ²⁴ For a discussion of instant states and accompanying problems, see Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes* (New York, 2009), pp. 169–199. See also Uzi Rabi, *The Emergence of States in a Tribal Society* (Sussex, UK, 2011).
- ²⁵ The five Arab Human Development Reports are available at www.arab-hdr.org.
- ²⁶ All figures drawn from the 2009 Arab Human Development Report: The Report in Brief (www.arab-hdr.org/publications/contents/2009/execsummary-e.pdf).
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.
- ²⁸ Stefan Wolff, "The regional dimensions of state failure," *Review of International Studies*, XXXVII: 3 (2011), 951–972.
- ²⁹ See: Daniel Brumberg, "The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy," *Journal of Democracy*, XIII:4 (2002), 56–68.

